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Over the past two decades, Taiwan’s successful export-led economic 
development has been documented in many studies (Scott 1979; Lee 
and Liang  1980; Stein 1981). Trade has expanded Taiwan’s domestic 
market and has provided  necessary capital goods and much needed 
materials.  More importantly, many industries established during this 
period have flourished with trade, have been directly in line with the 
comparative advantage of Taiwan, and have created a large amount of 
employment.  This development strategy has not only alleviated Tai- 
wan’s heavy population burden’ but has also improved its income dis- 
tribution  situation. The so-called Kuznets trap has been rather suc- 
cessfully avoided in the case of Taiwan. 
The export-led development process in Taiwan can be summarized 
as in table  11.1. In 1960 the trade dependence index (the ratio of the 
total amount of trade to the GNP) was 27.4%. The ratio doubled during 
the following ten years, exceeded  100 percent in  1980, and reached 
103.12% in  1983. Only a few other countries (e.g.,  Hong Kong and 
Singapore) have had higher trade dependence ratios than Taiwan. We 
might also hope that Taiwan has not been involved in reexport activ- 
ities. Given this situation, in order to assess Taiwan’s growth in the 
1980s, we first have to foresee its trade prospects, and then we will be 
in a position to analyze the probable links between trade and the do- 
mestic economy. Within the international economic setting, Taiwan’s 
strong position  as a big supplier to the  United States and to some 
European countries may already have demonstrated Taiwan’s potential 
as a future buyer. Oddly enough, during the past decade Taiwan has 
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Source: Council of  Economic  Planning and Development  (CEPD),  Taiwan Sratisrical 
Data Book 1983. 
aThe difference between GNP and GDP in Taiwan is negligible. 
bEstimated by assuming a 6.5% growth rate of GNP and a 10% growth rate of  trade in 
1983. 
accumulated a substantial trade surplus, in spite of having also had to 
contend with two bouts of stagflation. This accumulated foreign ex- 
change reserve  has  made  Taiwan  (and it may  be  the only  non-oil- 
exporting newly industrializing country in such a position) a net lender 
rather than a borrower on the international monetary market. 
This paper, focusing on the trade patterns and trends of  Taiwan, 
begins with a presentation of the trade structure of Taiwan in the past. 
It then analyzes the determinants underlying the changes that have 
been implemented in the trade structure. Three questions are discussed: 
(1) Can the trade patterns in Taiwan be explained by its vested com- 
parative advantage? (2) Should the trade fluctuations of  the 1970s be 
largely attributed to a lack of foreign demand, or should the rigid do- 
mestic monetary system, in particular the fixed exchange rate, share 
some of the blame? (3) Did the industrial  structural change that oc- 
curred when  Taiwan entered into a  post-labor-surplus  development 
stage in the  1970s  (called “secondary  import  substitution,”  i.e. ,  the 
establishment of  the materials and capital goods industries) affect the 
commodity composition of trade? Knowledge gained from this part of 
the analysis will be extremely useful to us when we examine the 1980s 
in the last section of the paper. 
11.1  Trade Structure, 1960-80 
11.1  The Growth of Trade 
Though Taiwan’s industrial and export sectors had already been par- 
tially developed during the colonial period, World War I1 destroyed 
much of it. It was not until the early 1950s that agricultural production 309  Trade Patterns and Trends of Taiwan 
returned to the prewar level. In the 1950~~  Taiwan’s economic policy 
was inward-looking, with top priority given to producing enough con- 
sumer nondurables and construction materials for basic needs. Exports 
in this period were traditional export items; sugar, rice, tea, and canned 
and tropical fruits accounted for the bulk of exports (87.4% in  1953 
and 67.7% in 1960). Manufactured exports, mainly textiles, were min- 
imal during the period  but did start picking up near the end of the 
period. The average annual growth rate of total trade in U.S.  dollars 
in the 1950s was 5.7%. 
At the end of the 1950s, by which time the domestic economy had 
gradually become  saturated, as evidenced by  stable prices and low 
utilization rates of industrial capacity (Tang and Liang 1975),*  the econ- 
omy seemed to have reached a turning point, requiring change. A set 
of policy reforms was therefore initiated around  1960, including two 
devaluations that brought the New Taiwan dollar to its market value, 
the unification of the multiple exchange systems, and the promulgation 
of the investment law, which provided various incentive schemes for 
investment (Lee and Liang  1980; Lin  1973). These policy measures 
created a favorable environment for encouraging exports. Nonetheless, 
it is still unclear whether these decisions, made during a critical period, 
were based upon careful calculations or were simply based on a belief 
that a market-oriented and more liberal policy should be put into effect. 
We  mention this because during the policy reform period no one pre- 
dicted the rapid expansion of trade that followed in the next decade, 
and  exports grew  only  at a  moderate  rate,  7.5% during  the policy 
transition period, 1958-61. 
In the  1960s, the  so-called export  promotion,  export substitution 
period, nominal trade grew at an average annual rate of 21.57%, which 
was about the growth rate of trade in real terms. In the 1970s, though 
nominal trade grew at an even higher rate, 30.73%, inflation accounted 
for more than half of it. During the export promotion stage, even though 
exports did increase much faster than imports, 25.32% compared with 
18.40%,  the trade balances were still negative in 1970. They have turned 
positive  since  1971. If  there had not been an energy crisis, Taiwan 
would have stored up a handsome trade surplus back in the first half 
of the 1970s. In the second half of the 1970s, when exports were boosted 
again, a total trade surplus of $4.48 billion was recorded. The trade 
surplus has continued to mount through  1981 and 1982. This time the 
important factor is not export expansion but is the shrinking of imports 
(see table 11.2). 
1 1.1.2  The Commodity Composition of Trade 
Taiwan’s export trade commodity composition has changed signifi- 
cantly over the past two decades. At present, Taiwan exports mostly 
manufactured goods in exchange for materials and capital goods. In 310  Chi Schive 
Table 11.2  Growth Rates of Trade in Taiwan (percentages) 
Imports  Exports  Total 
Value  Quantum  Value  Quantum  Value  Balance”  GNP 
1961-65  14.01  24.06  23.46  17.20  18.43 
1966-70  22.69  20.90  27.18  23.70  24.71 
1971-75  35.46  13.02  30.82  17.88  32.58 
1976-80  27.36  12.32  30.79  19.88  28.87 
1981-82  -1.74  -1.80  6.17  4.35  2.29 
1961-70  18.40  22.48  25.32  20.45  21.57 
1971-80  31.41  10.26  30.81  16.46  30.73 
I961 -82  22.48  15.81  26.07  18.27  23.98 
Source: CEPD, Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1983. 
Note: Value is in terms of U.S.  dollars. Quantum is based on 1976 prices. 
billions of dollars. 
-0.34  9.5 
-  0.57  9.8 
-  0.59  8.9 
4.48  10.4 
4.73  4.4 
-0.91  9.6 
3.89  9.6 
7.71  9.2 
1982,92.4% of total exports were accounted for by manufactures, 1.9% 
by agricultural products, and 5.7% by processed agricultural products. 
In 1970 nonagricultural products accounted for 78.6% of Taiwan’s total 
exports, but the figure was only 32.3% in 1960. 
While Taiwan has exported increasingly many manufactured goods, 
in both the relative and the absolute sense, the export composition of 
manufactures has also changed rapidly (see table 11.3). Over the past 
two decades, textiles have obviously been in the forefront of Taiwan’s 
exports, although their importance has declined since 1970, and they 
have now been replaced by electrical equipment and electronics. Ply- 
wood has followed basically the same pattern as textiles, but with an 
even shorter life cycle. Exports of metals  and metal products  with 
scraps from ship-breaking increased faster than total exports in the 
1960s and were further augmented by a modern steel complex estab- 
lished in the late 1970s. Another industry that demonstrated a remark- 
ably stable increasing trend in total exports, albeit slowly, was machinery. 
On the import side, in 1982 raw materials and manufactured inter- 
mediates  comprised  67.3% of  Taiwan’s total imports,  capital goods 
24.8%, and consumption goods only 7.9%. Looking backward for com- 
parison, we note that raw materials and intermediates were 62.8% of 
total imports in 1970 and 64.0% in 1960, and that the shares of capital 
goods and consumption goods in total imports were 32.3% and 4.9% 
in  1970 and 27.9% and 8.1% in  1960, respectively. Thus, during the 
past two decades Taiwan’s import composition has remained relatively 
stable, though some changes can still be identified. For instance, the 
proportion accounted for by consumption goods declined slightly in 
the 1960s and then rose gradually in the 1970s. The capital goods share 
in total imports displayed an opposite movement, having first an in- 
creasing trend in the 1970s and then a declining one in the 1980s. Table 11.3  The Trade Commodity Structure of Taiwan (percentages) 
A. Exports 
Manufactured Products 
Processed Agric. Products 
~  Elect. Eq.,  Metals 
Agric .  Canned  Plastic  & Metal  Electronics, &  Total 
Products  Sugar  Food  Total  Textiles  Plywood  Products  Products  Machinery  Appliances  Total  Exports 
32.3  100.0  1960  12.0  44.0  4.79  55.7  14.2  1.7  -  3.99  0.20  0.59 
46.0  100.0  1965  23.6  13.1  10.47  30.4  15.8  5.9  -  4.75  1.30  2.67 
1970  8.6  3.1  5.73  12.8  31.7  5.3  -  6.31  3.27  12.32  78.6  100.0 
1975  5.6  5.0  2.90  10.8  27.6  3.3  6.5  4.79  3.62  14.72  83.6  100.0 
90.8  100.0  1980  3.6  1.2  I .42  5.6  22.6  2.1  7.4  6.35  3.75  18.17 
92.4  100.0  1982  1.9  0.4  0.90  5.1  21.6  1.5  6.8  7.58  3.80  17.60 
B. Imports 
Capital Goods  Materials and Intermediates 
Consumer  Total  Elect. Eq.  Trans. 
Machinery  Total  Crude Oil  Iron & Steel  Chemicals  Total  Goods  Imports  & Electronics  Vehicles 
1960  15.5  27.9  6.4  9.5  6.7  64.0  8.1  100.0  5.3 
1%5  12.4  29.3  2.3  11.9  10.5  65.5  5.1  100.0  6.3 
1970  13.3  32.3  3.1  7.8  11.0  62.8  4.9  100.0  11.7 
1975  16.2  30.6  10.5  6.6  12.1  62.6  6.8  100.0  8.5 
1980  12.14  23.4  20.8  6.8  7.8  70.8  5.8  100.0  9.8 








Source: CEPD, Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1983. 312  Chi Schive 
A further breakdown of  the capital goods and materials categories 
reveals more information on changes in the import shares of certain 
commodities. Crude oil imports, which were not a major item at all in 
the 1960s, accounted for 10.5% of Taiwan’s total imports after the first 
oil crisis. In 1980, right after the second oil crisis, around one-fifth of 
Taiwan’s total imports consisted of oil. Because of the significant rise 
in oil imports, most of the other major import commodities have shown 
a declining trend in import shares after 1970. If we excluded oil from 
total imports, the import shares of machinery, iron and steel, and chem- 
icals would become more stable in the 1980s. However, there are two 
industries that show clearer trends in import shares. Electrical equip- 
ment and electronics (E&E) increased two percentage points in import 
shares between 1975 and 1982, even with oil included in total imports. 
Part of the increase in E&E items in total imports was due to the import 
of more consumer durables after  1975. Imports of transportation ve- 
hicles, on the other hand, decreased significantly after 1970, which was 
not due to the rise of oil imports either. In view of these changes in 
import composition, it can be inferred that import substitution for con- 
sumer goods continued in the 1960s and that for certain materials and 
capital goods (transportation vehicles in particular), was more gradual 
in the 1970s. 
1 1.1.3  Trade Partners 
Taiwan’s major contemporary trade partners are developed coun- 
tries  (DCs),  which  account  for  about  two-thirds  of  exports  and 
supply about the  same ratio of  imports. In the past, the DCs were 
not  as important  as buyers  as they  are at present,  but  they  sold 
more  to  Taiwan.  Less-developed  countries  (LDCs)  have  enjoyed 
favorable trade balances  with  Taiwan  since the first  energy  crisis. 
The newly industrializing countries  (N1Cs)-Korea,  Singapore, and 
Hong Kong-have  never been major recipients of Taiwan’s exports 
(see  table  11.4). 
Among the DCs, the United States has been the most important trade 
partner of Taiwan, especially as a buyer, over the past decade. In 1970 
the United States absorbed 39.70% of Taiwan’s total exports; the figure 
was 21.87% in  1961. However, the picture is different on the import 
side. The United States used to be Taiwan’s largest supplier in the early 
1960s but has gradually been replaced by Japan. In 1970 Japan provided 
41.46% of all imported commodities. This figure has also decreased in 
the 1970s, mainly because of the rise in oil imports. If we excluded oil 
from total imports, we would find that the U.S. position as a supplier 
of Taiwan’s imports has improved significantly since the 1970s. Simply 
from these figures, we would expect that Taiwan had amassed a large 313  Trade Patterns and Trends of Taiwan 
Table 11.4  Taiwan’s Trade Partners by Country Classification (percentages) 
_____~  ~~~  ~ 
DCs 
U.S.  Japan  EC  Total  LDCs  NICs 
Exports 
1961  21.87  28.81  8.35  60.14  21.76  18.16 
1965  21.54  30.17  9.86  65.44  25.51  10.05 
1970  39.70  15.19  9.83  70.64  15.16  14.18 
1975  34.28  13.04  13.67  68.61  19.50  11.81 
1980  34.08  10.96  13.21  65.98  22.13  11.89 
Imports 
~~~~  ~ 
1961  40.95  30.50  8.12  83.52  14.48  2.00 
1965  31.52  39.16  7.09  84.06  13.54  2.40 
1970  23.18  41.46  8.07  78.60  16.68  4.72 
1975  27.50  30.16  11.32  75.03  22.07  2.90 
1980  23.58  26.99  8.04  65.52  31.00  3.48 
Sources: Commodity Trade Statistics of the Republic of China (SITC Revised) Research, 
Development and Evaluation Commission, Executive Yuan, (1976). Data after 1975 are 
from Ministry of Finance, Trade Statistics of  the Republic of China. 
Note: NICs include Hong Kong, South Korea, and Singapore. Row summation may not 
equal 100 because of  rounding. 
trade surplus with the United States but a trade deficit with Japan. On 
the other hand, there have been recent signs indicating some encour- 
agement for the closing of these two trade gaps. The European Com- 
munity (EC) countries have become a much more important market 
for Taiwan. In 1970 the EC countries received 9.83% of Taiwan’s total 
exports, up from 8.35%  in  1961. However, by  1980 their share was 
over 13%. On the import side, the EC has continued to supply a roughly 
consistent share of Taiwan’s total imports during the last two decades. 
But if oil is again excluded, imports from the EC would increase beyond 
former levels. 
Table 1 1.5 gives a breakdown of  the commodity composition of Tai- 
wan’s foreign trade by country groups. In general, machinery (SITC 
7), chemicals  (SITC 9,  products from materials (including iron and 
steel) (SITC 6), and nonedible materials (SITC 2) were imported from 
the DCs. Fuel (SITC 3) and some nonedible materials (SITC 2) came 
from the LDCs. The DCs were most interested in Taiwan’s food items 
in the 1960s, but in the  1970s the demand of the DCs was more for 
miscellaneous items, including footwear, furniture, etc. The DCs’ pur- 
chase of machinery and materials accounted for 25.40% and  17.27% 
of Taiwan’s total exports in 1981. The LDCs and NICs were also large 
buyers of these goods. Tsble 11.5  Commodity Composition of Taiwan’s Foreign Trade (percentages) 
~  ~~~~ 





































2.09  23.19 
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1.35  100.00 
2.95  100.00 
0.12  100.00 
1 .OO  100.00 
0.71  100.00 
0.07  100.00 
2.05  100.00 
0.18  100.00 
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0.68  100.00 
6.18  100.00 
0.13  100.00 
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37.99  0.60 
37.19  0.26 
54.94  0.78 
19.91  0.11 
33.13  0.62 
17.19  0.14 
8.70  0.21 
21.90  0.08 
12.86  0.12 
8.61  - 
9.47  0.22 
7.79  0.05 
5.24  0.05 
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2.87  0.02 
0.64  0.02 
0.97  0.07 
0.93  0.16 
0.16  - 
1.32  0.01 
1.02  - 
0.22  0.01 
5.70  0.01 
0.84  0.01 
0.74  0.01 
5.40  - 
2.50  0.02 
6.09  12.71 
6.22  41.99 
3.66  50.10 
1.43  15.74 
6.35  53.84 
7.04  41.63 
0.73  17.86 
6.59  47.79 
2.57  47.67 
1.40  15.88 
3.44  34.27 
4.13  53.88 
1.86  17.27 
3.73  26.08 
















5.00  - 
1.57  0.02 
1.47  - 
12.83  0.06 
4.25  0.01 
9.71  0.03 
43.57  0.06 
13.36  0.01 
8.71  0.02 
46.89  0.02 
24.16  0.01 
9.56  - 
45.35  0.01 
30.74  0.01 
















Sources: Data before 1971 are from Commodity Trade Staristics of the Republic of China (SZTC Revised) (Executive Yuan, Research, 
Development and Evaluation Commission,  1976); data after 1971 are from Ministry of Finance, Republic of China, Monthly Statistics of 
Exports and Imports, various issues. 
Notes: NICs include Hong Kong, South Korea, and Singapore. 
SITC (Revised) 0: foods and animals. SITC 1: beverages and tobacco.  SITC 2: nonedible materials. SITC 3: mineral fuels, lubricants, 
and related materials. SITC 4: animal and vegetable oils. SITC 5: chemicals. SITC 6: manufactured goods classified chiefly by material. 
SITC 7: machinery and transport equipment. SITC 8: miscellaneous manufactured articles. SITC 9: commodities  and transactions  not 
classified according to kind. 316  Chi Schive 
11.2  Determinants of Trade 
11.2.1  Comparative Advantage 
Comparative advantage can explain  the  trade  pattern of  Taiwan. 
Taiwan is not rich in natural resources. Except for a few coal mines, 
which are thousands of feet underground, and limestone for cement 
plants, there are almost no valuable mineral deposits in Taiwan. The 
availability of arable land is also a problem. The existing amount of 
cultivated land,  around one-third  of  Taiwan’s total area, cannot be 
increased. Thus agricultural production has been raised, but at a de- 
creasing rate, in the past only via improvements in land productivity, 
not through cultivation of more land. Moreover, Taiwan’s population 
density is extremely high. Taiwan will continue to export labor-intensive 
products, as the neoclassical trade doctrine asserts. 
The results of studies on both the industrial level and the firm level 
confirm the predictions of neoclassical theory. Table 11.6 classifies all 
manufacturing industries into four trade categories according to their 
import and export ratios: export, import-competing, export-and-import- 
competing, and non-import-competing industries. Export industries re- 
fer to those industries that export more than 10% of their output and 
import less than 10%. Import-competing industries are just the oppo- 
site. If an industry exports more than 10% of its production and imports 
more than 10% of its total supply (domestic production plus imports), 
then this industry is classified as an export-and-import-competing in- 
dustry. If  both the export and import ratios are less than lo%, then 
this industry is called a non-import-competing one. 
Table 11.6  Capital Intensity and Skilled-Labor Intensity by Trade Category 
Capital-Labor Ratio  Skilled-Labor to Total 
(NT $1,000 per worker)  Labor Ratio 
1966  1971  1976  1966  1971  1976 
~~  ~ 
Export industries  64.73  124.08  734.76  .3387  ,4253  .I306 
Export- and import-  60.81  146.56  1,527.49  .4755  SO67  ,3650 
Import-competing  96.10  356.22  1,400.30  .4738  5350  .4245 
Non-import-competing  46.52  52.85  1,353.90  .3715  ,2152  ,1873 




Sources:  1966 and  1971 figures are from Lee and Liang  1980, 343.  1976 figures are 
calculated from CEPD, Taiwan Input and Output Table 1976, The Republic of China. 
Capital and labor (skilled and unskilled) data for each industry are from CEPD. 317  Trade Patterns and Trends of Taiwan 
With the  total capital (measured by  fixed assets only) and labor 
requirement data for producing one unit of  final product, we can cal- 
culate an average capital-labor ratio for each group of industries by 
using the production volume of each industry as a weight. In 1966 each 
worker in the exporting industries used NT $64.73 thousand worth of 
capital; the figure for the import-competing industries was NT $96.10 
thousand. For non-import-competing industries (consisting mainly of 
foods, printing and publishing, etc.) the average capital-labor ratio was 
NT $46.52 thousand, the lowest among the four groups. The average 
capital-labor ratio for export-and-import-competing industries with no 
clear market sign was NT $60.81 thousand. In 1971 the average capital- 
labor ratio of  all manufacturing industries increased to NT $154.15 
thousand from NT $69.99 thousand in  1966, with a good deal of the 
increment the result of capital deepening in the import-competing in- 
dustries.  In short, the export industries in  the  1960s used a slightly 
more labor-intensive technology than the export-and-import-competing 
ones. Both categories of industry were characterized by a much lower 
capital-labor ratio than that of the import-competing industries. Thus, 
the results for  1966-71  are in accord with the theoretical prediction 
that Taiwan would export high-labor-content products in exchange for 
high-capital-content goods. 
An interesting question is whether Taiwan’s trade patterns changed 
in the first half of the 1970s (a different period when Taiwan experienced 
for the first time real wage growth that equaled or  exceeded productivity 
growth) or remained the same as the pattern outlined above.3 In 1976 
the export industries were still the most conservation-oriented group 
in terms of using capital, while the export-and-import-competing and 
non-import-competing industries had been continuing the process of 
capital deepening at a fast clip and had succeeded in raising their capital- 
labor ratios to about the same level as those of the import-competing 
industries. Part of the change in the non-import-competing industries 
was due to industry reclassification-for  instance, cement was classi- 
fied as an export industry in 1971, but it became a non-import-competing 
one in 1976 and hence raised the average capital-labor ratio of the non- 
import-competing industries significantly. However, reclassification was 
not a factor in raising the ratio for the export-and-import-competing 
industries. Thus, a large amount of investment was directed during the 
period to the export-and-import-competing  industries. In addition to 
this,  we  might  also point out that the capital-labor  ratio difference 
between the export industries and the other three industry categories 
lessened in the relative  sense. Without more recent data for further 
comparison,4 the results reached here tend to suggest that the capital 
deepening was a general phenomenon for the manufacturing sector in 
response to the labor-shortage pressure constantly felt in the post-labor- 318  Chi Schive 
surplus stage in the 1970s, though the doctrine of comparative advan- 
tage still influenced Taiwan’s trade pattern. 
The Hecksher-Ohlin hypothesis, usually focusing on capital and la- 
bor only, can be viewed from another perspective. That is, if a country 
has abundant unskilled labor, then the country will export those prod- 
ucts having a higher unskilled-labor content than that of its imports. 
Table 11.6 presents the ratio of skilled labor to total labor requirement 
for four industry groups. Export industries again were the most unskilled- 
labor-intensive  ones during the period from  1966 to 1976. In 1976 a 
much lower average skilled-labor ratio was observed for the non-im- 
port-competing industries. Part of the change was due to the fact that 
different  definitions were adopted for skilled labor.5 Another expla- 
nation, which has not yet been proved with detailed data, might be 
that automation polarized the labor requirement, which is to say that 
when labor was replaced by highly automated machinery, only a hand- 
ful of technicians or operators were needed (the jobs that could not be 
performed by machinery were certain packaging and delivery tasks, 
for which minimum training was required). Sectors adopting automa- 
tion  were flour mills and edible oil and cement plants; all are non- 
import-competing industries. 
A serious obstacle to analyzing the capital-labor ratio at the industry 
level is that an industry may simultaneously be involved in both import 
and export activities, and these different activities may  quite likely 
employ different types of technology. In fact, the import-and-export- 
competing industry group in table 11.6 is the largest one of the four 
trade categories. But with reliable industry data we may be able to 
solve  the problem.  The figures presented  in  table  11.7 are for this 
purpose. 
In 1975 a foreign-firm survey (foreign firm is defined as a company 
with any amount of foreign capital in it) including 607 companies in 
the manufacturing sector provided the needed data. Assuming that the 
company in the sample used similar technology for its products sold 
in both the domestic and the foreign markets, we may then weigh each 
company’s capital-labor ratio by its exports to take into account the 
size of export activity and by its domestic sales to take into account 
its domestic sales activity. We  will thus obtain the industry’s average 
capital-labor ratios for both exports and domestic sales. 
In  1975 exports resulted from foreign manufacturing firms with an 
average of U.S. $9.00 thousand worth of fixed assets per worker, whereas 
domestic sales were produced from foreign firms with an average of 
U.S.  $18.18 thousand worth of fixed assets per worker. Apparently, 
foreign firms as a whole tended to use different technologies for prod- 
ucts with different market orientations. In industry, the foreign firms 
that predominated  in the domestic sales in the foods and beverages, 319  Trade Patterns and Trends of Taiwan 
Table 11.7  Capital-Labor Ratios of  Foreign Firms Weighted by  Export and 
Domestic Sales, 1975 (in thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Fixed Assets per Worker 
Industry  Exports  Domestic Sales 
Foods and beverages  3.11  12.26 
Textiles  26.84  19.95 
Apparel  1.26  2.34 
Wood, bamboo, and  1.92  2.74 
Paper and paper products  12.00  11.42 
Leather and leather products  1.61  2.76 
Plastic and rubber products  2.29  10.76 
Chemicals  16.24  17.61 
Nonmetallic products  24.58  50.79 
Basic metals and products  3.89  5.24 
Machinery  3.32  10.47 
rattan products 
Electrical equipment and  2.89  3.95 
electronics 
Total  9.00  18.18 
Source: Foreign Firm Survey primary data, Investment Commission, Ministry of Eco- 
nomic Affairs,  1975. 
apparel, wood, bamboo, and rattan products, leather and leather prod- 
ucts, plastic and rubber products, nonmetallic products, basic metals 
and basic  metal products,  machinery,  and electrical equipment and 
electronics categories all used a much more capital-intensive technol- 
ogy than the firms which predominated in exports. The differences 
were extremely large in the foods and beverages, plastic and rubber 
products, and the machinery industries, of which the capital-labor ra- 
tios for local market sales were more than three times those for exports. 
In two industries, paper and paper products and chemicals, foreign 
firms did not greatly differentiate their production techniques with re- 
gard to market orientations. There was only one industry, textiles, in 
which export activities were more capital-intensive than in domestic 
market activities.  A closer look at this particular industry, however, 
revealed that a few artificial fiber makers with a large amount of com- 
mitted capital were active in exporting. 
By  using the same set of  data, we may easily  verify a corollary 
proposition that foreign firms located in the export-processing zones 
would use less capital per unit of worker than those outside the zones. 
In  view  of  the fact that  some companies in  the  zones rented  their 
buildings and land, a better measure here would be the value of ma- 
chinery and equipment per unit of direct worker, instead of fixed assets 
per unit of worker. In 1975 foreign firms in three zones used a total of 320  Chi Schive 
U.S. $789 worth of machinery and equipment per unit of direct worker, 
which is only  38.46%  of  the average figure for foreign firms in the 
electrical equipment and electronics industry limited to exporting ac- 
tivities (Schive 1982; Ranis and Schive 1985). 
1  1.2.2  Trade Fluctuations and Fixed Exchange Rates 
Trade in Taiwan has experienced two dips over the past ten years. 
One was in 1975 when exports decreased 5.7% in value, or remained 
barely the same as the previous year in real terms, and imports dropped 
16.8% in value, or 11.0% in real terms. The other was in  1982 when 
exports climbed only 4.2% in value, or actually decreased 1.1% in real 
terms, and imports shrunk both in value and in real terms by 5.4% and 
2.6%, respectively. These trade fluctuations were commonly attributed 
to the energy crisis followed by two worldwide recessions. These ex- 
planations  have been readily accepted by economists (who have be- 
lieved in the absorption approach) and have even been welcome among 
government officials charged with managing trade promotion  affairs. 
However, in the case of Taiwan, when we recognize that the economy 
has been maintaining a fixed exchange rate system with tight controls 
on foreign exchange, especially in the sense that the exchange rate has 
not varied in response to wild fluctuations of relative (domestic and 
foreign) prices, then we may look for other determinants, rather than 
blindly accepting the simplistic explanation given above. 
In analyzing Taiwan’s trade fluctuations, and the balance of trade in 
particular,  we  may look at its purchasing-power-parity  effective ex- 
change rates (NT dollar per U.S. dollar). First, before 1972 the official 
exchange rate was pegged at U.S. $1 to NT $40. In 1973 a 5% appre- 
ciation of the Taiwan dollar shifted the official exchange rate to 1:38. 
The currency appreciated further in 1978 to 1:36 (this rate was effective 
for three years).  In  1981, when Taiwan joined  the mainstream and 
adopted a flexible exchange rate system, the Central Bank still exer- 
cised its power over the financial market and depreciated the Taiwan 
dollar by 5.5%. 
In a free economy without price distortions, either against or in favor 
of trade, the exchange rate will vary in accordance with the balance 
of trade and changes in relative prices between foreign and domestic 
markets. In Taiwan, as pointed out earlier, a variety of incentive schemes 
were formulated to promote trade around 1960, including customs du- 
ties and indirect tax rebates and lower-interest-rate loans. This meant 
that in 1971, for example, an exporter, on average, would have received 
NT $5.71 extra beyond the official exchange rate for every U.S. $1 
worth of exports owing to the export incentives mentioned above (see 
table  11.8).  These incentives have declined  since  1971 and by  1981 
amounted to NT $1.53 for each U.S.  $1 worth of exports. By adding Table 11.8  Purchasing-Power-Parity Effective Exchange Rates on Exports 
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981 
A. Official exchange rate for exportsa 
B. Incentives (NT $) per U.S. $ of exports 
(NT $ per U.S.  $) 
Interest subsidyb 
Customs duties rebateC 
Indirect tax rebated 
Subtotal 
C. Nominal effective exchange rate (A + B) 
D. Taiwan's WPI (1960 = 100) 
E. Average WPI of  major trade partnersC 
F.  Exchange rate index' 
G. Purchasing-power-parity effective 
exchange rate on exports (C.E.F/D) 













































































































Sources: DGBAS,  Republic of  China, Commodity-Price Statistics Monthly,  Taiwan District; International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics; Economic Research Department, Central Bank of  China, Republic of  China,  Taiwan Financial  Statistics Monthly; 
Department of Statistics, Ministry of Finance, Yearbook of  Financial Statistics ofthe Republic of  China; Census and Statistics Department, 
Hong Kong, Consumer Price Index Report. Figures before  1978 are from Liang and Liang 1981. 
"Where the rates fluctuated over a period of  time, the mean of the range was taken. The rate up to 14  April  1958 was that applicable to 
exports by private enterprises. Therefore, until 30  September 1%3, it was the rate applicable to all exports other than a few commodities 
(e.g.,  sugar, rice, salt, bananas) for which lower rates applied. The same rate applied to all exports after 30 September 1963 (see Scott 1979, 
326). 
bThe difference in the interest on export loans and that on unsecured loans is treated as an export subsidy. 
CIncludes  defense surtax and harbor dues. 
dIncludes commodity tax, salt tax, and flood rehabilitation surtax. 
'An  average of wholesale price indexes in Australia, Canada, West Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Singapore, the 
United  Kingdom, and the United States, weighted by  Taiwan's  annual export value with the respective countries. When the WPI was not 
available, the consumer price index was used. 
'An  average of exchange rate index weighted by Taiwan's annual export value with the respective major trade partners. The exchange rate 
is expressed in terms of  U.S. dollars per unit of  the currencies of Taiwan's  trading partners. 322  Chi Schive 
the subsidies for exports to the official exchange rate, we derive the 
nominal effective exchange rate. 
Two other adjustments must be made before we reach the purchasing- 
power-parity effective exchange rates. In 1974 Taiwan experienced an 
inflation rate of 40.6%  in wholesale prices,  which was much higher 
than  the  average inflation rate  (23.5%) of  its major  trade partners. 
Surprisingly enough, the government failed to act to correct the over- 
valued NT dollar, which definitely weakened the export incentives and 
the international competitiveness of Taiwan exports in that year. During 
the four-year period from 1974 to 1978, the wholesale price index rose 
by only 3.8%, or less than 1%  annually. Nonetheless, in 1979 and 1980 
the WPI increased by  12.1% and 21.5%, respectively,  increases that 
were higher  than  the average  inflation rates of  Taiwan’s ten  major 
trading partners (see note e of table 11.8)) in the corresponding years 
(9.5% and 18.7%). These changes in relative prices again put Taiwan’s 
products at a disadvantage in the international market. Finally, we have 
calculated the effective exchange rate to take into account the U.S. 
dollar situation in the international market. 
Figure  11.1 depicts three curves, two representing Taiwan’s balance 
of trade for commodities and commodities plus services, respectively, 
and one for the real effective exchange rate on exports in the  1970s. 
From figure 11.1, first we observe a close movement between the two 
balance-of-trade  curves and a parallel movement between these two 
curves and that for the real effective exchange rate. These are four 
turning points on the balance of trade which matched nicely with the 
real effective exchange rate either simultaneously or with a one-year 
lag. Second, the movements of the three curves were more in tandem 
before  1975  than  afterwards;  the  magnitude of  fluctuations  has  de- 
creased for the real effective exchange rate since 1975 but not for the 
trade surplus. Third, the trade balance curves reveal roughly an in- 
creasing trend, while the real effective exchange rate shows a declining 
trend. 
The first observation reminds us that the trade fluctuations in Taiwan 
in the 1970s could not be attributed completely to external factors. The 
varying real effective exchange rate, caused mainly by unstable do- 
mestic prices, was also relevant. Looking again at the situation in 1974, 
in that single year the real effective exchange rate deteriorated about 
NT $8 for U.S. $1 worth of exports, or appreciated 18% annually, or 
23% when compared with the 1972 figure. It is very difficult to accept 
that there was trade inertia when the exchange rate moved so radically. 
The second finding is probably due to the inflationary effect, resulting 
in larger trade balance variations. For the third finding, an increasing 
trade surplus, to a large degree, reflects a long-term improvement of 
Taiwan’s international competitiveness, while the declining effective 323  Trade Patterns and Trends of Taiwan 
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Fig. 11.1  Trade balance and the real effective exchange rates, 1970- 
80 
exchange rate was mainly caused by the gradual lifting of the export 
incentives. 
To  focus on the turning points of the curves, if the appreciations of 
the NT dollar did result in a weak competitive position for Taiwan’s 
exports, then the factors underlying the appreciations deserve further 
attention. As pointed out earlier, both appreciations could be attributed 
mainly to higher inflation in Taiwan and abroad. It would be superficial 
to say that the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 and the later tripling 
of oil prices in 1979 were absolutely responsible for Taiwan’s inflation. 
A multiple-regression analysis showing that import prices can explain 
domestic inflation quite satisfactorily would not be surprising, because 
Taiwan has imported around half of what it produced, and hence import 
prices are weighted heavily in calculating the domestic WPI. Further 
questions should be asked: Has inflation in Taiwan been higher than 
in neighboring countries (Japan, Hong Kong, or Singapore) that have 
depended on imported energy? Is there any way to calculate the impact 
on domestic prices of  the rise in oil prices? 324  Chi Schive 
To answer the first question, in 1974 the inflation rate was 31.4% in 
Japan in WPI, 22.33% in Singapore in CPI, and 15.0% in Hong Kong 
in CPI (all much lower than the WPI inflation rate of 40.7% in Taiwan). 
In 1979 and 1980, when Taiwan experienced an average 17.7% rise in 
WPI, rates were  12.5% in Japan,  17.0% in Singapore, and  13.9% in 
Hong  Kong in  CPL6 For  the  second question,  we assume full-cost 
pricing that reflects the oil price surge by using input and output tables 
and estimate that 52.19% of domestic inflation in  1973 and 1974 and 
70.35% in 1979  and 1980 were attributable to the price surge of imported 
materials, mainly the external oil price shocks.’ With this information, 
Taiwan’s inflation during the two periods coinciding with the two oil 
crises was not completely the result of higher imported-oil prices, even 
taking all imported materials into account.8 In other words, a strong 
demand increase in these two periods was also relevant,  or we can 
state that demand-pull inflation coexisted with cost-push inflation in 
the 1970s. 
On the demand side, we found that the money supply increased at 
the unusually high rates of 42.2% and 31.9% annually during 1972-73 
and 1976-78, but at much lower rates during the rest of the 1970s (table 
11.9). A very rapid expansion in the money supply in both subperiods, 
much more than the economy could have absorbed, built up inflationary 
pressure, which inevitably raised the domestic price in the following 
subperiods. In examining the sources of monetary increase, we find 
that 98.72% of the increase in the money supply between  1972 and 
1973 came from the accumulation of foreign assets that had resulted 
directly from the trade surplus. An equally high percentage contribution 
to the increase of the money supply from the same sources took place 
in the 1976-78  subperiod. 
In short, Taiwan experienced wild fluctuations in GNP growth, trade 
expansion, and the price level in the 1970s, though the trend toward 
economic growth remained  basically  the same as during the earlier 
Table 11.9  Factors Affecting the Money Supply in %wan  (percentages) 
Percentage Contributed by: 
Annual  Claims on 
Changes in  Gov. & En-  Net For.  Saving & Gov. 
Money Sup.  terprises  Assets  Dep.  Others”  Total 
1972-73  42.2  188.4  98.7  -  142.9  -44.2  100.0 
1974-75  19.6  351.1  -73.1  -  148.8  -29.2  100.0 
1976-78  31.9  182.2  89.8  -  156.1  -15.9  100.0 
1979-80  15.2  362.7  -8.1  -  171.8  -82.8  100.0 
Source: CEPD, Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1983. 
=Others  include presettlement requirements for imports and other items (net). 325  Trade Patterns and Trends of Taiwan 
decades. The trade variation, or that of the balance of trade, was caused 
to a certain extent by the changing position of the real effective ex- 
change rate, for which unstable domestic prices were also responsible. 
The sources of domestic inflation can be traced to the fixed exchange 
rate system, in addition to external factors. Under the fixed exchange 
rate system the undervalued NT dollar encouraged exports and allowed 
the stockpiling of a large trade surplus, which, in turn, increased the 
money supply and the domestic price level later. Thus, Taiwan in the 
1970s had a monetary system that was too rigid and a price level that 
was  too flexible. All  this  meant that when  the fixed exchange rate 
system failed to correct the undervalued local currency, the correction 
was made in the process  of  a higher domestic inflation rate, which 
resulted in an appreciation of the local currency anyway. The impact 
on trade of the readjustment of exchange rates was that the undervalued 
NT dollar boosted trade first, but then the appreciation later dampened 
it, and the magnitude of the trade fluctuations increased accordingly. 
11.2.3  Secondary Import Substitution 
Loosely used, import substitution refers to the augmentation of do- 
mestic production to replace imports. More strictly defined, import 
substitution occurs during a certain period  only if  the import share 
(imports over total supply) decreases. However, in measuring the im- 
port substitution effect, either at the industry level or at the aggregate 
level, most existing studies suffer from two limitations. First, imports 
are improperly compared with “gross”  domestic production (Morley 
and Smith 1970);9  i.e., the production of an industry usually includes 
not only the final product but also a number of different kinds of in- 
termediates for that product. Therefore, the total production of the 
industry is not strictly comparable with the imported goods, which are 
final products. Second, the studies do not distinguish between imports 
for final and intermediate usages. The first limitation is purely due to 
the data problem, which can be solved by excluding all intermediates 
when measuring a product or by using an input-output table to convert 
imports into the “gross”  measure of imports for comparison. The sec- 
ond  limitation  has  conceptual  significance  and  deserves  further 
elaboration. 
LDCs prefer  the inward-looking,  import  substitution strategy be- 
cause it protects the domestic market against foreign competition and 
therefore is easier to implement. Furthermore, by protecting the do- 
mestic market it facilitates the decision-making process for investment. 
Given the fact that a developing country is often in short supply of the 
entrepreneurial talent for decision making, this approach is not without 
merit. As to which industry is to be developed, in the earlier phase of 
the import substitution period this strategy focuses on consumer goods, 326  Chi Schive 
and nondurables in particular, since consumer goods usually account 
for a large share of imports and the technology required to manufacture 
nondurable consumer goods is most likely not too sophisticated. This 
approach is also in line with Hirschman’s linkage concept, i.e.,  the 
notion that backward linkages are better thought out than are the for- 
ward  ones (Hirschman  1958). However,  when  the domestic market 
gradually becomes saturated, whether it is wise to continue the same 
inward-looking policy (i.e., to develop certain upstream industries after 
the downstream industries have already been established) or to pursue 
an outward-looking policy becomes debatable. 
The appropriate policy response may seem rather obvious for a small 
economy like Taiwan or Korea, based either upon the empirical evi- 
dence of their past performance or upon the theoretical reasoning that 
exports can alleviate the constraints of scale economies just as they 
reduce the inefficiencies in resource allocation produced by the pro- 
tectionism of the inward-looking policy. Nonetheless,  after years of 
successful export-led growth-now  that exports have greatly expanded 
Taiwan’s markets and increased the volume of domestic production in 
certain  industries, now  that the economy  has  had  to contend with 
rapidly rising wages because of previous labor shortages, produced by 
the fast-growing export sector, and now that the nation’s technological 
base is sufficiently high to support the development of some relatively 
high-technology industries-is  the time perhaps right for the economy 
to develop certain intermediate and capital goods industries? It is from 
this line of reasoning that the secondary import substitution strategy 
can be justified and the distinction between imports for final consump- 
tion and those for intermediate uses in measuring the import substi- 
tution effect becomes relevant. 
For the manufacturing sector as a whole, the results shown in table 
1 1.10 indicate that the ordinary import substitution measure as well as 
the revised measure both had negative signs in the 1960s. In the first 
half of the 1970s, although the ordinary Chenery measure became pos- 
itive, the sign for the revised measure remained negative. Furthermore, 
we also want to notice that the revised import substitution measure 
had a much larger negative value than the Chenery index. Thus, Taiwan 
was still in the import substitution stage when the export-led growth 
strategy was put into effect. 
This finding, which may look puzzling and which differs from the 
general impression that Taiwan had terminated its import substitution 
stage by the end of the 1950s, is in fact quite logical. The majority of 
Taiwan’s first manufactured exports were consumer goods with very 
high import content or products that were assembled and packaged 
from imported parts. It was actually the increasing amount of imports 
that facilitated the rapid expansion in exports. Further breakdown of 327  Trade Patterns and Trends of Taiwan 
Table 11.10  Import Substitution Coefficients of the Manufacturing Sector in 
Taiwan (percentages) 
Revised Formula 
Chenery Formula (IS)  First (IS9  Secondary (ISsi)  Total (IS’) 
1964-66  -  17.33  - 
1966-7 1  -2.54 
1971-76  1.12 
19.09  -  8.90 
1.44  -  10.17 
2.31  -4.01 
-  17.99 
-  8.73 
-  1.70 
Source: See relevant issues of the input-output tables of the Republic of China (published 
by CEPD). 
Nores: The import substitution formulas are derived as follows: 
IS = Z, (mo - ml)/AX, 
where X  = domestic production (vector), M  = imports (vector), Z  = X  + M,  m = M/Z, 
and 0 and 1 represent the beginning and ending of a year. IS = import substitution index. 
IS* = Z*  (mo* - ml*)/AX, 
where M* =  (1 -  A)-’M,  A is the input-output matrix, Z*  = (I -  A)-[,  F  = final de- 
mand vector,  m*  = M*IZ*. 
IS*’ = Zo*  (mo*‘  ~  m I *‘)/AX, 
IS*f = Zo*  (mo*J - ml*J)/AX, 
M’ = intermediate imports vector, Mf  = final goods imports vector, m*f  = (1 - A)-lMf, 
M  = M‘ + Mf. 
M*‘ = (1 -  A)-’M’, 
the revised import substitution index verifies this because the second- 
ary import substitution index became worse in the second half of the 
1960s, precisely at the time when exports grew at the highest rate. The 
secondary import substitution index even remained negative during the 
first half of the 1970s, though the import substitution for final goods 
index had been positive since the middle 1960s. 
The overall picture we have painted above for Taiwan’s import sub- 
stitution is not necessarily representative of each separate industry. 
Using the same technique, table 11.11 presents those industries that 
have become  significantly self-sufficient (that is, the replacement  of 
imported intermediates and capital goods by domestic substitutes has 
contributed more than 10% to their growth). In the 1960s, some ma- 
terials industries (petrochemical raw materials, steel and iron, artificial 
fibers) increased production, and a part of  the increase has been used 
to substitute for previous imports, thereby lowering the import ratios 
of these industries. The capital goods industry, including machinery, 
electrical equipment and electronics, steel and iron products, and trans- 
portation equipment, performed equally well during the same period. lo 
In the first half of  the 1970s, the artificial fibers, artificial fabrics, steel 
and iron, and transportation equipment industries continued the pre- 
vious import substitution development pattern. The “other industrial 
chemicals” category also joined the secondary import substitution group 328  Chi Schive 
Table 11.11  Industries with Significant Import Substitution Effects 
Materials Industry  Capital Goods Industry 
1964-66  Cotton, wool, and fabrics; artificial  Steel and iron products; 
fiber fabrics; petrochemical raw  machinery 
materials; artificial fibers; 
steel and iron 
artificial fibers; miscellaneous 
manufactures  and electronics; 
1966-71  Rubber and rubber products;  Steel and iron products; 
machinery; electrical equipment 
transportation equipment 
1971  -76  Artificial fabrics; artificial  Transportation 
fibers; other industrial  equipment 
chemicals; steel and iron 
Source: See relevant issues of the input-output tables of the Republic of China (published 
by CEPD). 
Note: Industries with significant import substitution effects refer to those industries with 
IS*' 2 10% (or IS*' 2 10% for capital goods industries). 
for the first time in the 1970s. These industry data clearly reveal that 
some material and capital goods industries had already been developed 
in the 1960s and early 1970s that have increasingly supplied domestic 
needs and moreover have reduced domestic reliance on imports. 
11.3  Trade Patterns and Trends of Taiwan in the 1980s 
Before predicting Taiwan's future trade patterns and trends, we should 
first lay the groundwork by making the following points: 
1.  Taiwan's  trade dependence  index  has  already exceeded  100%. 
Though a further increase in trade dependence is not impossible, more 
emphasis will probably be placed on the net contribution of trade to 
the domestic economy, i.e., the development of secondary import sub- 
stitution industries. 
2. Over the past decade Taiwan has experienced wild fluctuations in 
growth, trade, and the price level. Nonetheless, the basic increasing 
trends of economic growth and trade have not changed. In fact, Taiwan 
has performed relatively better than Korea and Japan in exports, and 
even in growth, during the last recession period. 
3. The government must have learned a hard lesson from its mis- 
management of monetary policy in the 1970s, which was at least partly 
responsible for the domestic inflation that hurt Taiwan's exports. After 
moving into a flexible exchange rate system, price instability could be 
avoided to some extent. 
4.  According  to the revised  secondary import substitution index, 
Taiwan might have already entered into this phase in the second half 329  Trade Patterns and Trends of Taiwan 
of the 1970s. Several materials and capital goods industries that were 
established in the 1960s and continued to grow through the 1970s reveal 
significant import substitution effects. This group of industries is ex- 
pected to expand both in its coverage and in the size of individual 
industries. 
5. Taiwan has exported basically labor-intensive or unskilled-labor- 
intensive products. However, in view of rising wages, export industries 
and export-and-import-competing industries have been employing in- 
creasingly capital-intensive techniques to raise labor productivity. 
6.  For  the time being,  Taiwan has a large trade  surplus with  the 
United States and the EC countries as a whole, but it also has a large 
deficit with Japan. The accumulated trade balances have created dif- 
ficulties for both Taiwan and its major trade partners. 
7. In spite of the gradual lifting of the export incentives, the New 
Taiwan dollar is getting stronger and stronger as a result of the accu- 
mulation of foreign exchanges from trade surplus. 
On the basis of  the circumstances outlined above, we expect the 
following: 
1. Trade will continue to grow in the 1980s but at a slightly slower 
rate than before, owing to the development of the secondary import 
substitution industries. 
2. As the result of the successful development of the local materials 
and capital goods industries, the commodity composition of imports 
will change, with consumption goods increasingly imported (the com- 
sumption goods share in total imports has already shown an increasing 
trend). On the export side, Taiwan will become a strong competitor in 
the international markets for machinery and several intermediate prod- 
ucts: steel and iron products,  petrochemical raw  materials, artificial 
fibers, etc. 
3. Taiwan’s traditional exports (textiles, garments, rubber and plastic 
products) will maintain an important share of Taiwan’s total exports. 
Modernization efforts in these industries should help recapture, at least 
partly, the competitive position of these product types, which has re- 
cently been lost. 
4. With a more cautious monetary policy, it is hoped that Taiwan 
will not repeat the same mistake it made in the  1970s. We  expect a 
moderate appreciation of the NT dollar resulting from the stockpiled 
volume of foreign exchange. An appreciation of the local currency will 
be healthy for the domestic economy in the long run because by low- 
ering the cost of  imported materials, appreciation helps stabilize do- 
mestic prices and generates pressure for further improving efficiency. 
5. The United States and Japan will still be the top two trade partners 
of Taiwan in the near future. The trade ties between Taiwan and the 
EC countries will be further improved. 330  Chi Schive 
6. Though the trade imbalances between Taiwan and Japan and be- 
tween Taiwan and the United States (and even including the EC coun- 
tries) cannot be corrected overnight, there is one area of hope. That 
is, Taiwan has been receiving more technology from the United States 
and the EC countries.”  If the technology flow leads the trade flow, 
then trade between Taiwan and the United States will increase faster 
than that between Taiwan and Japan. 
Notes 
1. In the 1950s and 1960s the population of Taiwan grew, respectively, by 
3.5% and 2.7% annually. In the 1970s the growth rate remained high, at 1.9%. 
The population density of 512 persons per square kilometer in Taiwan in 1982 
was the second highest in the world, behind Bangladesh. 
2. We should, however, exercise some caution in accepting the low-utilization 
argument because unless the utilization was higher before, which has not been 
proved yet, the lower utilization rate alone does not imply market saturation. 
3. In the 1960s labor productivity  in the manufacturing sector increased at 
a higher rate than the growth rate of the money wage, which implies a declining 
unit labor cost. In the first half of the 1970s, wages rose on the average of an 
annual rate of 22.58% in money terms, or 9.93% in real terms, compared with 
a 6.07% rise in labor productivity. 
4.  We  do have input-output  tables for 1979. Nonetheless,  these tables  are 
extensions of the 1976 tables.  Moreover, the 1979 tables contain ninety-nine 
industries, roughly one-half of the number of industries contained in the 1976 
tables.  Thus distortion  would  be unavoidable if  the two sets of tables  were 
used for comparison. 
5. In the 1966 and 1971 data, skilled labor refers to those workers with more 
than three years’ work experience. This definition classifies almost all farmers 
as skilled laborers and obviously raises the skilled-labor ratios for those relevant 
agricultural products industries  when a total labor requirement  instead of a 
direct one is used in estimating the skilled-labor ratio. In the 1976 data, farmers 
are excluded from the skilled-labor group. 
6. Inflation rates for the four regions were taken from CEPD, Taiwan Sta- 
tistical Data Book 1983; and Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, PaciJic 
Basic Economic Indicators. 
7. Internal report of the Council for Economic Planning and Development, 
1981. 
8. Ibid. 
9. For the measurement of the “gross”  product, see note to table  11.10. 
10.  It should be noted  that some industries cover both  consumption  and 
capital goods. Because of data limitations, however, it is impossible to  separate 
them. 
11. In three major industries (electrical equipment and electronics, machin- 
ery, and chemicals) that are receiving foreign technology through formal tech- 
nical collaboration, Japan’s contribution to the technology flow declined during 
the  1970s. For  instance, Japan accounted for 89% of  the total technical col- 331  Trade Patterns and Trends of Taiwan 
laboration cases in the electrical equipment and electronics industry in  1970, 
but only 75% in 1979; 93% in the machinery industry in 1972, but only 72% in 
1980; and 53% in the chemicals industry in 1973, but 43% in 1981 (Schive 1980, 
1981, 1983). 
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